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The psychology of conspiracy theory beliefs is not yet well understood, although research
indicates that there are stable individual differences in conspiracist ideation – individuals’
general tendency to engage with conspiracy theories. Researchers have created several
short self-report measures of conspiracist ideation. These measures largely consist of
items referring to an assortment of prominent conspiracy theories regarding specific real-
world events. However, these instruments have not been psychometrically validated, and
this assessment approach suffers from practical and theoretical limitations. Therefore, we
present the Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale: a novel measure of individual differ-
ences in generic conspiracist ideation. The scale was developed and validated across four
studies. In Study 1, exploratory factor analysis of a novel 75-item measure of non-event-
based conspiracist beliefs identified five conspiracist facets. The 15-item GCB scale was
developed to sample from each of these themes. Studies 2, 3, and 4 examined the struc-
ture and validity of the GCB, demonstrating internal reliability, content, criterion-related,
convergent and discriminant validity, and good test-retest reliability. In sum, this research
indicates that the GCB is a psychometrically sound and practically useful measure of con-
spiracist ideation, and the findings add to our theoretical understanding of conspiracist
ideation as a monological belief system unpinned by a relatively small number of generic
assumptions about the typicality of conspiratorial activity in the world.
Keywords: conspiracy theories, conspiracist ideation, individual differences, personality, psychometric instrument,
scale design
INTRODUCTION
A conspiracist belief can be described as “the unnecessary assump-
tion of conspiracy when other explanations are more probable”
(Aaronovitch, 2009, p. 5). Substantial numbers of people endorse
conspiracy theories proposing that the U.S. government orches-
trated the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Stempel et al., 2007; Swami et al.,
2010), that the British government is covering up its own role in
the 7/7 bombings (Soni, 2007), and that the assassination of Pres-
ident John F. Kennedy was not the work of Lee Harvey Oswald
alone (Goertzel, 1994; McHoskey, 1995), to name but a few popu-
lar conspiracy theories (see McConnachie and Tudge, 2008). Such
beliefs are usually unsubstantiated and implausible, but are often
regarded as harmless (e.g., Clarke, 2002). Yet some conspiracy the-
ories are associated with negative outcomes; conspiracist beliefs
about the origin and treatment of HIV/AIDS have been found to
detrimentally affect attitudes toward preventative measures and
adherence to treatment programs (Bogart et al., 2010), and con-
spiracist fears concerning the safety of childhood vaccinations have
played a role in declining vaccination rates (Salmon et al., 2005;
Kata, 2010; Offit, 2011). Other conspiracy theories can lead to
social and political disengagement (Butler et al., 1995; Jolley and
Douglas, 2013) and may help to foster political extremism (Bartlett
and Miller, 2010).
To date only a small handful of studies have begun to investi-
gate the formation and maintenance of conspiracy beliefs, largely
examining the role of individual differences in broad personality
traits and cognitive styles (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; McHoskey, 1995;
Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Leman and Cinnirella, 2007; Douglas
and Sutton, 2008, 2011; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Darwin
et al., 2011; Swami, 2012). The handful of available findings sug-
gests that conspiracist beliefs are linked with traits such as low
interpersonal trust, paranoia, and receptivity to other unusual
beliefs. The relationships between conspiracy beliefs and more
established psychological measures or general models of personal-
ity are largely unknown. Some research has examined correlations
between conspiracist ideation and the Big-5. Weak but signifi-
cant relationships have been reported with higher openness and
lower agreeableness, however some studies have failed to replicate
these relationships (see Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Swami and
Furnham, 2012).
One robust finding to emerge from the limited existing litera-
ture is that individuals who endorse one conspiracy theory tend
to endorse others, including unrelated theories (Goertzel, 1994;
Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013), fictitious theories made up by
psychological researchers (Swami et al., 2011), and even mutually
contradictory theories (Wood et al., 2012). In total, these findings
suggest that endorsement of conspiracy theories is not exclusively
a result of rational evaluation of the evidence relating to each spe-
cific conspiracist claim; rather it appears there are stable individual
differences in the general tendency to engage with conspiracist
explanations for events. This trait has been termed “conspiracist
ideation” (Swami et al., 2011).
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Much more research is required to illuminate the psychology
of conspiracist ideation, and the number of recent publications on
the topic (e.g., Leman and Cinnirella, 2007; Douglas and Sutton,
2008, 2011; Bogart et al., 2010; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Dar-
win et al., 2011; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami, 2012; Wood et al.,
2012; Jolley and Douglas, 2013) suggests that research is gaining
momentum. However, research is limited by the lack of a validated
measure of individual differences in conspiracist ideation. To pro-
duce a coherent body of research it is necessary to devise a valid
and psychometrically sound measure which can be used across a
variety of empirical contexts.
PREVIOUS APPROACHES TOWARD MEASURING CONSPIRACIST
BELIEFS
Several scales have been created in an attempt to measure individ-
ual differences in conspiracist ideation. The dominant approach
has been to devise a short self-report questionnaire assessing belief
in a small number of conspiracy theories concerning real-world
events and situations. Measures have consisted of between six and
thirty items with each item referring to a specific currently popular
claim of conspiracy. Common subjects include the assassination of
President John F. Kennedy, the spread of HIV/AIDS, and the moon
landing (Goertzel, 1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Leman and
Cinnirella, 2007; Darwin et al., 2011; Douglas and Sutton, 2011;
Swami et al., 2013). Participants rate their endorsement of each
item on a Likert-type rating scale ranging from certain disbelief to
certain belief.
There has been little attempt to assess the psychometric prop-
erties of any existing measure; most studies have employed novel
measures, with little consideration of the psychometric properties
of the measure beyond noting the value of Cronbach’s alpha. In
addition, no measure has yet been adopted by researchers other
than the original authors. This situation presents practical and
theoretical problems. Despite the apparent homogeneity of this
approach toward measuring conspiracist ideation, idiosyncrasies
in item content could influence participant responses. Each scale
represents a unique sub-set of currently prominent conspiracy
theories; for example, climate-change conspiracy theories feature
in some scales (Douglas and Sutton, 2011) but not others (Swami
et al., 2010). In addition, items from different scales referring to the
same conspiracy theories may not be directly comparable due to
differences in wording. Consider two items concerning conspiracy
theories alleging the cover-up of extraterrestrials: “Governments
are suppressing evidence of the existence of aliens” (Douglas and
Sutton, 2011; Wood et al., 2012), and “Area 51 in Nevada, U.S., is a
secretive military base that contains hidden alien spacecraft and/or
alien bodies” (Swami et al., 2010). Although both items implicitly
refer to the same theory, the differences in tone and specificity may
systematically bias responses. It is possible therefore that existing
scales do not produce equivalent or directly comparable measures
of conspiracist ideation.
This practical problem could be resolved if researchers adopted
a single standardized measure. However, any such measure would
likely be unsuitable for cross-cultural research as responses may
be confounded by the cultural familiarity and relevance (or lack
thereof) of the selected theories (Byford, 2011). For example, con-
spiracy theories concerning the July 7, 2005, bombings in London
are relatively well-known within the U.K., but are likely to be
less familiar elsewhere. In addition, such a measure would require
modification over time as particular conspiracy theories fade from
popular awareness and new theories arise in response to world
events.
A more fundamental theoretical problem is that existing scales
assess attitudes toward a limited number of specific conspiracy
theories, yet their intended purpose is to provide a measure of
individuals’ generalized tendency toward conspiracy theorizing. A
successful measure of this overall conspiracist ideation ought to
reflect the entire spectrum of conspiracism. However, any mea-
sure referring to specific conspiracy theories faces the problem of
selecting a small and arbitrary sub-set of real-world conspiracy
theories out of a virtually infinite pool, with the assumption that
the selected items are representative of the individual’s overall level
of conspiracist ideation. While there is evidence that conspiracist
ideation is a unidimensional construct (Goertzel, 1994; Swami
et al., 2011; Wood et al., 2012), the content validity of short and
potentially unrepresentative measures has thus far gone untested.
MEASURING GENERIC CONSPIRACIST BELIEFS
The issues discussed so far raise concerns over the comparabil-
ity and generalizability of the handful of existing psychological
findings, and the theoretical validity and practical utility of any
measure which explicitly refers to prominent real-world con-
spiracy theories. An alternative and preferable approach toward
measuring conspiracist ideation may be to assess generic con-
spiracist beliefs (GCB). Recent theoretical advances suggest that
beliefs in specific conspiracy theories are a product of a smaller set
of more GCB. Wood et al. (2012) demonstrated that endorsement
of various specific conspiracy theories about the death of Osama
Bin Laden is predicted by acceptance of the more general claim
that the U.S. government is hiding some important information
about the Bin Laden raid. Thus, assessing an individual’s attitude
toward a single generic statement can provide a valid and eco-
nomical indication of beliefs about numerous specific conspiracy
theories.
It would be possible to produce a yet more generic scale item
concerning the more abstract idea that governments routinely hide
information about the deaths of public figures in order to deceive
the public. Endorsement of this abstract claim would presumably
provide a valid indication of an individual’s beliefs about many
popular governmental assassination conspiracy theories, such as
those concerning Osama Bin Laden, Princess Diana, and President
John F. Kennedy. To take another example, rather than referring
explicitly to conspiracy theories of the 9/11 attacks, a non-specific
item would have individuals rate their acceptance of the more
generic belief that conspiracy within governments to secretly per-
petrate terrorist activities on their own citizens is commonplace.
In sum, a scale which samples a representative range of these kinds
of GCB would assess individuals’ beliefs about the typicality of
conspiratorial activity in the real world removed from the context
of specific historical events.
Taking this generic, non-event-based approach toward measur-
ing conspiracist ideation can potentially overcome the previously
mentioned theoretical and practical problems associated with
measures referring to specific popular conspiracy theories. While
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constructing a measure which refers to specific real-world con-
spiracy theories necessitates arbitrarily selecting a small sub-set
of conspiracy theories and thus compromising content validity, a
generic measure could represent the entire spectrum of conspir-
acist ideation in an economical way by identifying and reflecting
the most important generic beliefs which support beliefs in numer-
ous specific conspiracy theories. While a measure referring to
currently popular conspiracy theories will require modification as
fashions in popular conspiracy theorizing change, a generic mea-
sure will remain an appropriate measurement device over time. In
addition, by decontextualizing conspiracist beliefs, a generic mea-
sure can provide a measurement device suitable for any sample
population.
To date, no measure of conspiracist ideation has been designed
from the bottom-up, endeavoring to first identify the most impor-
tant facets of conspiracism which a successful measure should
represent, and to provide a measure which represents these facets.
Our research was designed to produce such a measure.
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT STUDIES
We developed and validated the GCB scale, a novel measure of
individual differences in generic conspiracist ideation, across four
studies with diverse samples. Informed consent was obtained from
all participants and ethical approval for the research was granted by
the Goldsmiths, University of London Department of Psychology
Ethics Committee.
Study 1 details the first step toward creating a measure of
generic conspiracist ideation, which was to identify the most
important aspects of conspiracism which should be represented in
the measure. To ensure content validity, a measure should sample
from the entire gamut of conspiracist themes; however, a short
measure is desirable so as to avoid practical problems associated
with lengthy questionnaires such as participant frustration, care-
less responding, drop-out, and reluctance to take part in future
studies (see Schmidt et al., 2003; Donnellan et al., 2006). To rec-
oncile the conflicting requirements of brevity and completeness,
a lengthy measure consisting of 75 generic conspiracist items was
administered to an international sample of the general public and
subjected to exploratory factor analysis (N = 489) to identify the
underlying dimensions of conspiracism which a successful mea-
sure should represent. The 15-item GCB scale was created based
on the results of this initial study, and the subsequent studies
demonstrated the psychometric validity of this measure.
Study 2 aimed to establish content and criterion-related valid-
ity, as well as test-retest reliability, using a sample of undergraduate
students (N = 235) as is typical of most psychological research.
To this end, the factor structure of the scale, and its relation-
ships with other measures of conspiracist ideation were examined.
Study 3 aimed to establish convergent validity by examining how
well the GCB relates to interpersonal trust, anomie, paranormal
beliefs, and delusional ideation – individual difference factors
previously found to correlate with belief in conspiracy theories
(Goertzel, 1994; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011, 2013) –
using a sample of the general public (N = 208). Study 4 aimed
to establish discriminant validity by demonstrating the absence of
relationships between the GCB and measures of other theoreti-
cally unrelated constructs using a separate sample of the general
public (N = 194). These constructs consisted of sensation-seeking,
emotional intelligence, and the Big Five factors.
STUDY 1: IDENTIFICATION OF ESSENTIAL FACETS OF
CONSPIRACISM THROUGH EXPLORATORY FACTOR
ANALYSIS
METHOD
Participants and procedure
To recruit a large and diverse sample not composed exclusively of
undergraduate psychology students, volunteers were requested via
a blog post on psychologytoday.com and a public “Psychology of
the Paranormal”emailing list. In all, 500 participants (225 females,
269 males; no gender data for 6 respondents) completed the ques-
tionnaire. Data from 11 participants missing data for 2 or more
items were omitted (total valid N= 489). Age ranged from 18 to
87 years (M = 35.9; SD= 13.9). The majority of participants indi-
cated that they were British (43.8%) or American (26.4%). Other
nationalities accounted for 25.6% of the sample (4.2% did not
provide nationality information). No reward was offered for tak-
ing part. Self-selected respondents completed the questionnaire
online via a web-based interface.
Measures
Conspiracist beliefs scale (long-form). We designed a novel
questionnaire consisting of 75 items intended to reflect generic
(i.e., non-event-based) conspiracist beliefs. Items were generated
by reviewing the academic and popular literature on conspiracy
theories. Each item referred to a generic belief which could sup-
port belief in various real-world conspiracy theories. To produce
generic items, non-specific descriptors such as “certain organi-
zations,” “the government,” and “significant events” were used in
place of references to specific entities or events which are the sub-
ject of popular conspiracy theories, such as the U.S. government
and the 9/11 attacks. Effort was made to cover a diverse and fully
representative range of conspiracist claims. Examples include the
possibility of terrorist attacks being covertly directed by a country’s
own government, clandestine use of mind-control technology, and
concealment by some organization of evidence of extraterrestrial
visitation (see Table 1 for exact wording of all items). Participants
rated items on a 5-point Likert-type scale, with a qualitative label
associated with each point (1: definitely not true; 2: probably not
true; 3: not sure/cannot decide; 4: probably true; 5: definitely true).
RESULTS
Exploratory factor analysis using principal-axis factoring was con-
ducted to examine the internal structure of the 75-item measure
of conspiracist beliefs. Based on the observed Eigenvalues and
visual inspection of the scree plot, a six-factor solution was ini-
tially extracted. All negatively worded items were found to load
onto a single factor. As there was no clear conceptual grouping
other than their negative phrasing this was deemed indicative of
differential item functioning rather than a true latent dimension
(see Greenberger et al., 2003). Accordingly, all negatively worded
items were dropped. EFA was repeated on the remaining pool
of 59 items. The significance of Bartlett’s test of sphericity, χ2
(1711)= 23820.85, p< 0.001, and the size of the Kaiser–Meyer–
Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, KMO= 0.97, showed that
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Table 1 | Conspiracist Beliefs scale (long-form) items and factor loadings.
Factor
GM ET MG PW CI FUF
2. The government has employed people in secret to assassinate others 0.80 0.08 −0.10 −0.16 0.01 0.49
48. Government agencies have been secretly involved in the assassination of their own citizens 0.80 −0.01 0.02 −0.11 0.04 0.61
61. The deaths of certain high-profile public figures have been the result of covert,
government-sanctioned operations
0.75 0.07 0.06 0.04 −0.01 0.68
20. Certain world leading political figures who died untimely deaths were in fact “taken out” by
government operatives
0.72 0.07 0.02 −0.01 −0.02 0.65
55. Some of the people thought to be responsible for acts of terrorism were actually set up by
those responsible
0.65 −0.04 0.10 0.21 −0.14 0.68
19. For strategic reasons, the government permits certain terrorist activities to occur which could
otherwise be prevented
0.63 −0.02 −0.05 0.33 −0.07 0.71
69. Some acts of terrorism, which have resulted in the deaths of many civilians, have been secretly
directed by government operatives
0.61 −0.12 0.10 0.31 −0.09 0.71
57. High-level politicians have had certain people killed in order to prevent embarrassing events from
becoming publicly known
0.58 −0.03 0.01 0.15 0.05 0.66
38. Government agencies secretly keep certain outspoken celebrities and citizens under constant
surveillance
0.56 0.04 0.03 −0.16 0.19 0.52
34. The government keeps many important secrets from the public 0.53 0.08 −0.04 −0.21 0.30 0.52
9. Some individuals thought to be responsible for the assassination of public figures were set up by
the group responsible
0.52 0.05 0.04 0.18 0.00 0.67
15. The government lies about their knowledge of terrorist activities 0.49 −0.08 −0.14 0.09 0.36 0.61
22. There are ongoing, hidden efforts to marginalize, control, or destroy certain groups of people
through the use of political policies
0.45 −0.10 0.12 0.01 0.33 0.68
1. Certain celebrities and/or public figures actually faked their own deaths in order to escape the
spotlight
0.41 0.08 −0.20 0.26 −0.03 0.43
27. Viruses and/or diseases have been deliberately disseminated to infect certain populations 0.37 0.02 −0.03 0.24 0.06 0.57
4. The government has staged important societal events in order to manipulate voters 0.36 −0.05 0.09 0.10 0.18 0.59
12. The government fakes evidence relating to significant world events to deceive citizens 0.31 −0.01 0.12 0.15 0.28 0.73
30. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public 0.02 0.91 −0.05 −0.12 0.14 0.63
53. Evidence of alien presence on earth is being covered up 0.02 0.90 −0.04 −0.03 0.07 0.66
25. Secret organizations communicate with extra terrestrials, but keep this fact from the public 0.09 0.87 −0.06 0.05 −0.05 0.64
29. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned or staged in order to distract the public from real
alien contact
0.09 0.76 −0.03 0.06 0.04 0.68
10. Some existing technologies are the result of reverse engineering alien technology −0.02 0.73 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.63
37. Space missions are deliberately sabotaged so that the public does not learn of existing alien
activity in the solar system
0.00 0.61 0.03 0.36 −0.17 0.66
58. Movies and TV shows featuring aliens are a way of preparing the population for the news that
aliens are real and have visited earth
−0.12 0.58 0.27 0.15 −0.05 0.64
59. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown groups who really control
world politics
0.08 −0.02 0.88 −0.04 0.00 0.80
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Factor
GM ET MG PW CI FUF
11. A small, secret group of people is actually in control of the world economy −0.11 0.04 0.87 −0.01 0.05 0.75
70. Certain significant world events have been the result of the activity of a small group who
secretly manipulate world politics
0.17 −0.03 0.87 −0.08 −0.01 0.80
42. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as
going to war
−0.10 −0.01 0.86 0.08 0.05 0.78
68. Members of a secret group have infiltrated governments and powerful organizations in order to
1 day bring their group to the point of global control
0.04 0.03 0.76 0.04 −0.02 0.75
64. Many well-known celebrities, politicians, and wealthy people are members of a secret society
which has control over our lives
−0.07 0.08 0.67 0.15 −0.03 0.70
14. Large, influential industries are in fact tightly controlled by a small, secret group of people 0.07 −0.02 0.66 −0.03 0.17 0.63
44. Small groups of people are in possession of secret knowledge which would change our
understanding of the world, and are deliberately keeping it hidden
0.09 0.17 0.38 0.05 0.28 0.80
40. Secret organizations have access to large amounts of personal data on every citizen and sell it
to the government
0.09 0.17 0.38 0.05 0.28 0.66
50. The rapid spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed
efforts of some organization
0.10 0.05 0.00 0.68 −0.02 0.73
36. Experiments involving new drugs are carried out on the general public without their knowledge
or consent
−0.03 0.04 0.09 0.66 0.07 0.75
18. Cures for certain deadly and common diseases exist, but are being deliberately withheld −0.13 0.04 0.09 0.65 0.07 0.73
7. Certain natural disasters have in fact been the result of secret testing of powerful and advanced
technology with unknown capabilities
0.08 0.14 −0.06 0.64 −0.07 0.65
41. The pharmaceutical industry administers harmful treatments without people’s consent in order
to keep people sick and boost drug sales
0.02 0.12 0.14 0.63 −0.07 0.73
23. Technology with mind-control capacities exists and is currently being used on people without
their knowledge
−0.01 0.14 0.09 0.62 0.00 0.73
24. A lot of information about diseases and treatments is withheld from the public −0.06 −0.12 −0.07 0.61 0.48 0.75
8. The government withholds a lot of information about diseases and their treatments from the
public
−0.02 0.02 −0.06 0.56 0.32 0.72
33. Certain chemicals are put in the water supply in order to control the people −0.13 0.18 0.26 0.54 −0.06 0.70
46. Experiments involving advanced technologies are carried out on the general public without their
knowledge or consent
0.08 0.07 0.11 0.53 0.05 0.74
3. Groups of scientists deliberately attempt to create panic about future risks because it is in their
interests to do so
0.07 −0.03 −0.17 0.49 0.35 0.61
62. Advanced technology is secretly used to placate the people and suppress dissent 0.06 0.05 0.22 0.49 0.06 0.78
39. The government deliberately permits certain terrorist activities to occur to keep the public in a
state of fear
0.41 −0.03 0.14 0.47 −0.06 0.82
54. Progress toward a cure for cancer, AIDS, and other diseases is deliberately being hindered −0.13 0.08 0.11 0.45 0.33 0.72
13. Technology with mind-control capacities is tested on people without their knowledge or consent 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.44 0.02 0.75
(Continued)
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Table 1 | Continued
Factor
GM ET MG PW CI FUF
51. Some viruses and/or diseases which many people are infected with were created in laboratories
as bio-weapons
0.11 0.09 0.05 0.43 0.14 0.70
60. Family planning policies are part of a plot to control and limit certain populations 0.05 0.02 0.14 0.28 0.23 0.62
66. Drugs are deliberately supplied to certain communities in order to marginalize or destroy them 0.26 0.00 0.24 0.26 0.06 0.71
28. New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is being suppressed 0.20 0.10 0.01 −0.11 0.62 0.64
52. New and better technology is suppressed by those whose current business would be disrupted
by it
0.23 0.06 0.10 −0.19 0.62 0.66
65. Groups of scientists ensure that only evidence which supports a pre-determined conclusion is
made known to the public
−0.14 0.05 0.10 0.16 0.57 0.63
72. Technology is being concealed which is far in advance of what is known to the general public 0.05 0.13 −0.03 0.14 0.57 0.70
21. Government funded scientists manipulate evidence in order to support existing government
policy
0.15 −0.01 −0.02 0.14 0.53 0.67
74. The media ensures that only certain information is made known to the public 0.18 −0.08 0.07 0.09 0.45 0.60
71. Certain groups of scientists fabricate data in support of a particular scientific theory out of
self-interest
0.17 −0.09 −0.04 0.15 0.43 0.53
17. The government has a large amount of confidential data on every citizen without their
knowledge or permission
0.08 0.00 0.18 −0.05 0.38 0.49
Unrotated eigenvalues 27.5 3.75 1.71 1.38 1.59
% Of variance accounted for following rotation 19.7 15.3 21.6 22.8 18.5
N=489. Rotated loadings above 0.32 are shown in bold. GM, government malfeasance, ET, extraterrestrial cover-up, MG, malevolent global conspiracy, PW, personal
wellbeing, CI, control of information, FUF, first unrotated factor.
the 59 items had adequate common variance for factor analysis
(Tabachnick and Fidell, 2005). Examination of initial Eigenval-
ues and visual inspection of the scree plot prompted investigation
of the first unrotated factor as well as a five-factor solution. Par-
allel analysis (O’Connor, 2000) suggested a potential six-factor
solution; however, given the relatively more meaningful pattern
of item loadings, the more parsimonious five-factor solution was
retained.
The first unrotated factor accounted for 46.64% of the total
variance [Eigenvalue (λ)= 27.52], over seven times more than the
second unrotated factor (λ= 3.75, 6.36% of variance accounted
for). All items loaded positively with loadings ranging from 0.43
to 0.82 (see Table 1). Cronbach’s α for this factor was 0.98. Despite
the strong first unrotated factor the forced five-factor solution was
analyzed.
The five-factor solution explained 60.9% of the total variance.
Promax oblique rotation was used based on the assumption that
the factors should be related to one another. Following rotation
the five factors accounted for approximately equal amounts of
variance. Each factor had a minimum of five items loading sub-
stantially (0.50 or greater) and univocally on to that factor. Three
items which failed to achieve a loading of 0.32 or greater on any
factor were dropped. The few items that cross-loaded onto more
than one factor were assigned to the factor that reflected their
highest loading (factor pattern matrix loadings, item loadings for
the first unrotated factor, Eigenvalues, and variance accounted for
by each factor are shown in Table 1).
The pattern of loadings reflected conceptually meaningful,
cohesive, and distinct groupings. Factor one, termed govern-
ment malfeasance (GM), reflected allegations of routine criminal
conspiracy within governments. This factor contained 16 items
(α= 0.93). A second factor, termed extraterrestrial cover-up (ET),
contained seven items (α= 0.94) concerning the deception of the
public about the existence of aliens. A third factor, termed malev-
olent global (MG) conspiracies, consisted of nine items (α= 0.94)
concerning allegations that small, secret groups exert total control
over global events. A fourth factor, termed personal well-being
(PW), consisted of 16 items (α= 0.95) relating to conspiracist
concerns over personal health and liberty such as the spread of
diseases and the use of mind-control technology. The fifth fac-
tor, termed control of information (CI), contained eight items
(α= 0.87) relating to unethical control and suppression of infor-
mation by organizations including the government, the media,
scientists, and corporations.
Factor scores were computed by averaging participants’
responses to each item associated with that factor. All five
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factors were modestly to strongly positively intercorrelated, and
all strongly correlated with the overall scale score (see Table 2).
DISCUSSION
The results of exploratory factor analysis conducted on a large
set of generic conspiracist scale items suggests that five impor-
tant facets of conspiracism must be represented by a successful
measure of conspiracist ideation: GM conspiracies; MG conspir-
acies; extraterrestrial conspiracies; PW-related conspiracies; CI
conspiracies. Unsurprisingly, given previous evidence for the uni-
dimensional structure of conspiracy beliefs (e.g., Goertzel, 1994;
Wood et al., 2012), as well as the strong first unrotated factor
and factor intercorrelations observed here, real-world conspiracy
theories frequently merge these different themes. For instance, a
conspiracy theory alleging that the U.S. government is secretly
colluding with intelligent extraterrestrials to control and harm
the human population using advanced technologies merges sev-
eral of the facets identified here into a single specific theory. The
factors identified here are thus not intended to reflect discrete
categories of conspiracy theory but rather fundamental underly-
ing assumptions about the world which promote beliefs in many
specific conspiracy theories.
STUDY 2: FACTOR STRUCTURE, RELIABILITY, AND
CRITERION-RELATED VALIDITY OF THE 15-ITEM GCB SCALE
METHOD
Participants and procedure
A sample of 235 university undergraduate students was recruited
from amongst several U.K. universities. Participants took part in
exchange for entry into a £50 prize draw. Data were collected online
via a web-based interface, and participants were asked to complete
the questionnaire in a single sitting. Participants were primarily
female (77.9%) and British or Irish (75.7%). Age ranged from 18
to 59 years (M = 24.97; SD= 8.76).
Test-retest data for the GCB scale were solicited from the first 70
participants who completed the questionnaire at Time 1, of which
42 responded and provided complete Time 2 data. Participation in
the follow up study at Time 2 was voluntary; no reward was offered.
The interval between Time 1 and Time 2 assessments was approx-
imately 5 weeks. The GCB was the only measure administered at
Time 2.
Measures
Generic conspiracist beliefs scale. A 15-item scale was devised
(full item wording and instructions to participants can be found
in Table A1 in Appendix). Three items were generated to represent
each factor identified in Study 1. These five factors were intended
to guide construction of the measure, ensuring content validity;
however, given the observed factor intercorrelations and frequent
merging of themes observed in real-world conspiracy theories, in
practical usage the final GCB is primarily intended to assess con-
spiracist ideation as a unidimensional construct. In the interest of
producing the most concise measure possible, it was not deemed
necessary to include more than three items per factor. As the long-
form measure designed for Study 1 was intended to reveal the
important generic assumptions upon which a subsequent measure
should be based rather than to provide definitive scale items, the
Table 2 | Correlations between factor scores and overall Conspiracist
Beliefs scale (long-form) score.
Factor ET MG PW CI Overall score
GM 0.49 0.73 0.77 0.77 0.89
ET 0.66 0.73 0.54 0.73
MG 0.84 0.74 0.90
PW 0.77 0.95
CI 0.87
N=489. All correlations significant at the level p<0.001 (2-tailed). GM, govern-
ment malfeasance, ET, extraterrestrial cover-up, MG, malevolent global conspira-
cies, PW, personal wellbeing, CI, control of information.
wording of some high-loading items was modified slightly to refer
more clearly to the intended GCB, some novel items were gen-
erated by merging a number of similar high-loading items into
one, and some high-loading items from Study 1 were included
unchanged. Participants again rated items on a 5-point Likert-
type scale, with a qualitative label associated with each point (1:
definitely not true; 2: probably not true; 3: not sure/cannot decide; 4:
probably true; 5: definitely true).
Belief in conspiracy theories inventory. The BCTI assesses belief
in 14 conspiracy theories regarding specific real-world events or
organizations (α= 0.92; example item “Government agencies in
the UK are involved in the distribution of illegal drugs to ethnic
minorities”) (BCTI: Swami et al., 2010). A mean BCTI score was
computed for each participant, excluding those with more than
one missing data point (total valid n= 213).
Belief in 9/11 conspiracy theories. Belief in 9/11 conspiracy theo-
ries (Swami et al., 2010) was measured using a scale consisting of 17
items, each of which presents a specific conspiracy theory relating
to the 9/11 terrorist attacks (α= 0.97; example item, “Individu-
als within the US government knew of the impending attacks and
purposely failed to act on that knowledge”). The responses of par-
ticipants with more than one missing data point were excluded
(total valid n= 217).
Belief in 7/7 conspiracy theories. Belief in 7/7 conspiracy theo-
ries (Swami et al., 2011) was measured using a scale consisting of
12 items covering a range of specific conspiracy theories relating
to the London bombings of July 7, 2005 (α= 0.95; example item,
“The fact that the UK government is withholding information about
the 7/7 bombings is evidence of a cover-up”). The responses of par-
ticipants with more than one missing data point were excluded
(total valid n= 220).
Belief in fictitious Red Bull conspiracy theories. Belief in fic-
titious Red Bull conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2011) was
measured using a scale consisting of 12 items covering a range
of novel conspiracy theories regarding the energy drink Red Bull
(α= 0.90; e.g., “Red Bull contains illegal substances that raise the
desire for the product”). Each of these statements was made up for
the purposes of previous research. The responses of participants
with more than one missing data point were excluded (total valid
n= 218).
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Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their age,
gender, and nationality.
RESULTS
Descriptive data
A mean GCB score was computed for each participant. On the
whole, participants demonstrated modest conspiracist ideation;
participants were mildly skeptical but neither strongly agreed
nor strongly disagreed that the conspiratorial behavior described
by the GCB occurs routinely, evident from a grand mean score
(M = 2.61; SD= 0.87) approaching the mid-point of the range
of possible values (3.00). Means for each item also reflected this
trend, with item means ranging from 1.88 (SD= 1.13) for the item
“Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep
this fact from the public” to 3.86 (SD= 1.21) for the item “A lot of
important information is deliberately concealed from the public out
of self-interest.” No floor or ceiling effects were evident; ratings for
each item covered the entire range of possible scores and showed
acceptable levels of skew. Overall GCB mean scores showed slight
positive skew (0.24).
Internal reliability and factor structure
Reliability and factor analyses were restricted to participants with
complete item level GCB data (n= 225). The overall internal
reliability of the GCB scale was extremely high (α= 0.93). A max-
imum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis using Amos 20.0
was conducted to test the intended five-factor structure of the
GCB scale. Given the scale intercorrelations observed in Study
1, a model was specified in which each factor was allowed to
correlate with each other factor. Table 3 shows factor loadings
for each item, and Table 4 shows factor intercorrelations. Model
fit was evaluated using the following goodness-of-fit indices: the
chi-square per degree of freedom (χ2/df) ratio, the comparative
fit index (CFI), the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the root mean
square error of approximation (RMSEA), and the standardized
root mean square residual (RMR). A χ2/df ratio of less than three
indicates acceptable fit (Byrne, 2001). Concerning CFI and GFI
indices, models with a value of 0.90 or above can be considered
as adequately fitting. A RMSEA value below 0.08 indicates ade-
quate fit. A RMR value of 0.05 or lower indicates close model
fit. These rules of thumb are considered overly strict in some
circumstances, including small sample size (N < 250); in such
cases values approximating the above can be considered satisfac-
tory (Marsh et al., 2004). The results indicated adequate fit. A χ2
value of 140.76 was obtained (df= 80, p< 0.001, χ2/df= 1.76).
Other fit indices were: CFI= 0.97; GFI= 0.92; RMSEA= 0.06;
RMR= 0.06. This five-factor model was a better fit for the data
than a unidimensional model, according to the χ2 difference
Table 3 | GCB scale items and standardized factor loadings obtained with confirmatory factor analysis.
Scale item Factor
GM MG ET PW CI
1. The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and keeps this a
secret
0.75
6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement 0.86
11. The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity 0.82
2. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown groups who really control world politics 0.77
7. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as going to war 0.83
12. Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world
events
0.91
3. Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public 0.75
8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public 0.87
13. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned or staged in order to distract the public from real alien contact 0.80
4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some organization 0.74
9. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on people without their knowledge 0.69
14. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or
consent
0.77
5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public 0.69
10. New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is being suppressed 0.75
15. A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest 0.70
N=225. GM, government malfeasance, ET, extraterrestrial cover-up, MG, malevolent global conspiracies, PW, personal wellbeing, CI, control of information.
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Table 4 | Correlations between latent variables.
Factor ET MG PW CI
GM 0.56 0.81 0.85 0.74
ET 0.66 0.72 0.46
MG 0.87 0.61
PW 0.79
N=225. All correlations significant at the level p<0.001 (2-tailed). GM, govern-
ment malfeasance, ET, extraterrestrial cover-up, MG, malevolent global conspira-
cies, PW, personal wellbeing, CI, control of information.
test for nested models (χ2= 203.08, df= 90; χ2(diff)= 62.32,
df(diff)= 10, p< 0.001).
Short-term retest reliability
Within the test-retest sample (N = 42), mean GCB scores at
Time 1 and Time 2 were 2.34 (SD= 0.82) and 2.28 (SD= 0.78),
respectively. A paired samples t -test revealed that overall mean
GCB scores did not change significantly over the 5-week interval;
t (40)= 1.14, p= 0.26. Additionally, the correlation between mean
GCB scores at Time 1 and Time 2 was positive and strong (r = 0.89,
p< 0.001), indicating good test-retest reliability.
Criterion-related validity
The correlation between GCB and BCTI scores was strong
(n= 202, r = 0.82, p< 0.001). GCB scores correlated strongly
with scores on the measure of belief specifically in 9/11 (n= 206,
r = 0.75, p< 0.001) conspiracy theories. In addition, mean GCB
scores correlated moderately with endorsement of 7/7 (n= 205,
r = 0.67, p< 0.001) theories, and with fictitious Red Bull theories
(n= 209, r = 0.61, p< 0.001).
To examine the criterion-related validity of the five individ-
ual GCB facets, a multiple regression analysis was performed
with belief in 9/11 conspiracy theories as the criterion variable
and the scores on the five GCB factors as predictors. The over-
all regression model was significant; F = 38.06, p< 0.001, Adj.
R2= 0.47. Of the five factors, GM, reflecting the belief that govern-
ments routinely act to harm their own citizens, was the strongest
predictor (see Table 5 for standardized β values, t -values, and
p-values).
DISCUSSION
The approximately normal distribution of mean GCB scores, cen-
tered close to the mid-point of the scale, and the absence of
floor/ceiling effects or strong skew suggests that the GCB has
acceptable psychometric properties and successfully captures vari-
ation in conspiracist ideation within the undergraduate student
population. The results of the confirmatory factor analysis indi-
cate that the intended five-factor structure has been retained
in the 15-item GCB. Thus, the scale possesses content validity,
adequately reflecting the five major components of conspiracist
ideation revealed by Study 1. The strong correlation between par-
ticipants’ GCB scores after a 5-week interval indicates excellent
short-term test-retest reliability.
The pattern of relationships between the GCB and mea-
sures of conspiracist ideation assessing belief in certain specific
Table 5 | Results of multiple regression analysis with GCB factors
scores predicting 9/11 conspiracist beliefs.
Factor β t p
Government malfeasance 0.317 4.08 <0.001
Extraterrestrial cover-up 0.197 2.99 <0.01
Malevolent global 0.191 2.33 <0.05
Personal wellbeing 0.125 1.46 0.16
Control of information −0.032 −0.49 0.63
event-based conspiracy theories indicates criterion-related valid-
ity; that is, mean GCB scores successfully correlate with scores
on other measures of conspiracist ideation assessed concurrently.
Most of these relationships were strong. The smallest relation-
ship – with a measure assessing endorsement of an entirely novel
conspiracy theory – was still substantial and in the expected
direction. In addition, the individual factor scores differentially
predicted endorsement specifically of 9/11 conspiracy theories,
with the GM factor predicting these beliefs most strongly. This
indicates that, to the extent that certain specific event-based con-
spiracy theories pertain more or less to particular GCB facets, the
factor scores may be useful in predicting beliefs in different the-
ories. In total these findings indicate that the GCB has acceptable
criterion-related validity.
STUDY 3: CONVERGENT VALIDITY AND ADDITIONAL
EVIDENCE OF CRITERION-RELATED VALIDITY OF THE GCB
METHOD
Participants and procedure
To recruit a diverse non-student sample, volunteers were requested
via a public “Psychology of the Paranormal” emailing list. A total
of 208 participants (91 females, 116 males, 1 participant did not
provide gender information) completed the survey. Age ranged
from 18 to 63 years (M = 40.5; SD= 13.5). The majority of par-
ticipants indicated that they were British or Irish (69.2%) or U.S.
(10.1%) citizens. Other nationalities made up 19.2% of the sam-
ple (1.4% did not provide nationality information). Self-selected
respondents completed the questionnaire online via a web-based
interface.
Measures
Generic conspiracist beliefs scale. The 15-item GCB scale devel-
oped for Study 2 was used unchanged. The internal reliability of
the GCB scale in the current study was extremely high (α= 0.95).
Belief in conspiracy theories inventory. The BCTI was admin-
istered once again to ensure criterion-related validity in a non-
student sample (BCTI: Swami et al., 2010). As in previous studies,
the BCTI demonstrated high internal reliability (α= 0.93). A mean
BCTI score was computed for each participant.
Interpersonal trust. Interpersonal trust was measured using a
three-item scale (α= 0.70; example item: “You can trust your fam-
ily”) which has been used in previous research on conspiracist
belief (Goertzel, 1994). A moderate negative correlation with GCB
scores was expected based on previous findings (Goertzel, 1994).
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Anomie. Anomie (the belief that the world is generally getting
worse) was measured using a three-item scale (α= 0.59; example
item: “It’s not really fair to think about having a child in today’s
world”) which has been used in previous research on conspiracist
belief (Goertzel, 1994). A moderate positive correlation with GCB
scores was expected based on previous findings (Goertzel, 1994).
Australian sheep-goat scale. Belief in the paranormal was mea-
sured using the 18-item ASGS (α= 0.96; example item,“I believe in
the existence of ESP”) (ASGS: Thalbourne and Delin, 1993). This
measure assesses belief in extrasensory perception, psychokinesis,
and life after death. Participants respond to each item on a three-
point scale, labeled “True” “?” (i.e., do not know), and “False,”
resulting in a score of 2, 1, or 0 points, respectively. Higher scores
reflect stronger belief in the paranormal. A moderate correlation
with conspiracy theory beliefs was expected based on previous
findings (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011).
Peters delusions inventory. The PDI-21 is a psychometrically val-
idated measure of delusional ideation within the general popula-
tion (PDI-21: Peters et al., 2004). Internal reliability in the current
study was high (α= 0.94). The PDI assesses magical ideation, para-
noia and schizotypal traits, which have previously been linked with
belief in conspiracies (Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2013). In
addition, one item explicitly refers to conspiracy (“Do you ever feel
there is a conspiracy against you?”). Thus a moderate correlation
with GCB scores was expected.
Demographics. Participants were asked to indicate their age,
gender, and nationality.
RESULTS
Descriptive data
Participants generally demonstrated modest conspiracist ideation,
with the grand mean (M = 2.22; SD= 0.92) approaching the mid-
point of the range of possible values (3.00). The mean rating
for each item also reflected this trend, with average item ratings
ranging from 1.61 (SD= 0.94) for the item “Secret organizations
communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the pub-
lic” to 3.52 (SD= 1.27) for the item“A lot of important information
is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest.” No floor
or ceiling effects were evident; ratings for each item covered the
entire range of possible scores and showed acceptable levels of
skew. Overall GCB scores showed mild but acceptable positive
skew (0.76).
Criterion-related and convergent validity
The correlation between GCB and BCTI scores was positive and
strong (r = 0.86, p< 0.001). Higher GCB scores correlated mod-
estly with delusional ideation, higher anomie, lower interpersonal
trust and stronger belief in the paranormal. A similar pattern of
correlations emerged between BCTI scores and the personality
measures (see Table 6 for all inter-scale correlations, means, and
standard deviations).
DISCUSSION
The descriptive statistics indicate that the GCB retains acceptable
psychometric properties when used on samples not composed
Table 6 | Means, standard deviations, and inter-scale correlations for
Study 3.
GCB (M =2.22;
SD=0.91)
BCTI (M =2.58;
SD=1.50)
Trust (M =5.15; SD=1.11) −0.34 −0.26
Anomie (M =5.06; SD=1.29) 0.42 0.38
ASGS (M =8.77; SD=1.50) 0.67 0.67
PDI (M =31.37; SD=31.83) 0.48 0.45
All correlations significant at the level p<0.001.
entirely of undergraduate students. Together with the results of
Study 2, this indicates that the GCB is an appropriate measure-
ment device both for student and non-student samples. On the
whole, participants in the current study (self-selected from the
general population) indicated similar, though slightly lower, levels
of conspiracist ideation than the student sample reported in Study
2. The strong correlation between the GCB and the BCTI indi-
cates that the GCB possesses criterion-related validity when used
with a non-student sample; that is, higher GCB scores successfully
correlate with stronger endorsement of specific conspiracy theo-
ries. The observed pattern of correlations between the GCB and
measures of interpersonal trust, anomie, paranormal belief, and
delusional ideation is consistent with previous findings (Goertzel,
1994; Darwin et al., 2011; Swami et al., 2011, 2013), and indi-
cates that the GCB converges with related measures. In addition
the GCB demonstrated a highly similar pattern of correlations
with trust, anomie, delusions, and paranormal belief as did the
BCTI, as would be expected of a successful measure of conspiracist
ideation. In total these findings indicate that the GCB possesses
criterion-related and convergent validity.
STUDY 4: DISCRIMINANT VALIDITY OF THE GCB
METHOD
Participants and procedure
To recruit a diverse non-student sample, volunteers were requested
via online forums and mailing lists. A sample of 194 participants
(88 females, 105 males, 1 participant did not provide gender infor-
mation) completed the survey. Age ranged from 18 to 81 years
(M = 35.0; SD= 14.8). The majority of participants indicated that
they were British or Irish (67%) or U.S. (12.9%) citizens. Other
nationalities made up 18% of the sample (2.1% did not provide
nationality information). Self-selected respondents completed the
questionnaire via a web-based interface.
Measures
Generic conspiracist beliefs. The 15-item GCB was administered.
Internal reliability was again extremely high (α= 0.95).
Big five inventory. The IPIP Big Five is a 50-item measure of
the Big-5 factor markers (IPIP Big-Five: Goldberg, 1999). Inter-
nal reliability for each of the five factors was acceptable in the
current study: openness (α= 0.75); conscientiousness (α= 0.83);
extraversion (α= 0.90); agreeableness (α= 0.82); neuroticism
(α= 0.85). Some previous studies have reported small but sig-
nificant relationships between belief in conspiracies and higher
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openness and lower agreeableness, but have found no relationships
with the other Big-5 traits (Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013). Thus
we anticipate that GCB scores will correlate weakly with openness
and agreeableness, and will be unrelated to the other Big-5 traits.
Sensation seeking. To demonstrate that the GCB is independent
of theoretically independent constructs beyond the Big-5, we first
selected trait sensation seeking (SSS-V: Zuckerman, 2007). Of the
Big-5 traits, sensation seeking is most strongly related to extra-
version (Aluja et al., 2003), which has consistently been found
to be unrelated to conspiracist ideation (e.g., Swami et al., 2010,
2011, 2013); thus, no strong relationship between GCB and SSS-V
scores is expected. The SSS-V is a 40-item questionnaire (α= 0.76)
assessing individual differences in sensory stimulation preferences.
Each question presents participants with two statements and asks
that they select the statement which best reflects their own person-
ality, e.g., “I like ‘wild’ uninhibited parties,” or “I prefer quiet parties
with good conversation.” Higher scores reflect greater sensation
seeking.
Emotional intelligence. Emotional intelligence appears to be
related to Big-5 neuroticism, but weakly and unreliably correlates
with agreeableness and openness (Petrides et al., 2010; TEIQue-
SF: Petrides and Furnham, 2006). Thus, no strong relationship
between GCB and TEIQue-SF scores is expected. The TEIQue-
SF is a 30-item measure of trait emotional intelligence (α= 0.87;
example item: “Expressing my emotions with words is not a problem
for me”). Higher scores reflect greater emotional intelligence.
RESULTS
Descriptive data
Once again, participants generally demonstrated modest conspir-
acist ideation, with a grand mean (M = 2.44; SD= 1.00) slightly
below the mid-point of the range of possible values (3.00).
No strong skew was evident (0.47). Means for individual items
reflected a similar trend as observed in Study 2 and 4, with mean
endorsement ratings ranging from 1.74 to (SD= 1.02) for the item
“Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep
this fact from the public” to 3.68 (SD= 1.31) for the item “A lot of
important information is deliberately concealed from the public out
of self-interest.” No floor or ceiling effects were evident; ratings for
each item covered the entire range of possible scores and showed
acceptable levels of skew.
Discriminant validity
Given the sample size of the study, correlations of r = 0.20 will be
detected at the level p< 0.05 with 80% confidence. Correlations
between GCB scores and each of the Big-5 traits, sensation seek-
ing, and emotional intelligence scores are shown in Table 7. No
significant correlations were found between conspiracist ideation
and sensation seeking, emotional intelligence, neuroticism, extra-
version, agreeableness, or openness. A small significant correlation
was found between conspiracist ideation and conscientiousness.
DISCUSSION
As in Study 2 and 3, the GCB demonstrated acceptable psycho-
metric properties, adequately capturing variation in conspiracist
Table 7 | Means, standard deviations, and inter-scale correlations for
Study 4.
GCB (M =2.44; SD=1.00)
Openness (M =4.03; SD=0.49) −0.01
Conscientiousness (M =3.13; SD=0.70) −0.16*
Extraversion (M =3.09; SD=0.83) −0.01
Agreeableness (M =3.85; SD=0.62) 0.11
Neuroticism (M =3.06; SD=0.72) −0.07
SSS-V (M =20.00; SD=5.84) 0.03
TEIQue-SF (M =4.92; SD=0.71) −0.14
*Correlation is significant at the level p<0.05.
ideation in a sample of the general population. In contrast to
some previous findings (Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013), conspir-
acist ideation as measured by the GCB was not related to the Big-5
traits agreeableness and openness, while a small but significant
correlation emerged between greater conspiracist ideation and
lower conscientiousness. While previous research looking at cor-
relations between Big-5 traits and conspiracist ideation has failed
to find this relationship, the small correlation may be explained
in terms of a failure to conscientiously attend to all the available
evidence, including that which conflicts with conspiracist claims.
However, among the few studies to report relationships with Big-
5 traits, the relationships have been small and not consistently
replicated (see Swami et al., 2010, 2013). It seems most reason-
able to conclude that relationships with these traits are small
and somewhat unstable. Thus, conspiracist ideation cannot be
described simply in terms of the Big-5 personality dimensions. As
expected, GCB scores were unrelated to the remaining Big-5 traits
of extraversion and neuroticism, as well as the related traits of
sensation seeking and emotional intelligence. Given the power of
the study to detect correlations of r= 0.20 or greater, the pattern
of non-significant correlations observed provides evidence for the
discriminant validity of the GCB scale; the GCB is either indepen-
dent of other theoretically unrelated psychological constructs or
is at most only weakly associated with them.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The aim of this research was to create and validate a novel mea-
sure of individual differences in conspiracist ideation. Previously
the dominant approach toward measuring conspiracist beliefs
has involved assessing attitudes toward a small number of arbi-
trarily selected event-based conspiracy theories (e.g. Goertzel,
1994; Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Leman and Cinnirella, 2007;
Swami et al., 2010; Darwin et al., 2011; Douglas and Sutton,
2011). Numerous scales have been devised, yet there has been
little attempt to validate the various measures or to adopt a single
measurement device, and there are concerns over the theoretical
validity and practical utility of this general approach. To over-
come these problems we elected to devise a measure which assesses
acceptance of the generic assumptions which support belief in
specific conspiracy theories.
Study 1 identified five facets of generic conspiracism through
exploratory factor analysis: belief in routine governmental malfea-
sance; belief in the existence of MG conspiracies; belief in the
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existence and cover-up of extraterrestrials; concerns over the
unethical CI; and belief in conspiracies infringing on PW and
liberty. The existence of these dimensions is not inconsistent with
other research which has found conspiracist ideation to be uni-
dimensional (e.g., Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010; Wood et al.,
2012; Bruder et al., 2013). Indeed, in the present research, the
five identified dimensions of conspiracism were highly intercor-
related. We argue that the five identified facets reflect a small
set of intercorrelated conspiracist assumptions which collectively
serve to promote and sustain beliefs in individual conspiracy
theories, resulting in a coherent network of specific conspiracist
beliefs.
Based on the findings of Study 1, the GCB, a short measure
sampling from each of the five identified facets of conspiracism,
was produced. Studies 2, 3, and 4 provide evidence of the reliabil-
ity, content, criterion, convergent, and discriminant validity of this
novel measure. The results of confirmatory factor analysis reported
in Study 2 demonstrated that the intended five-factor structure is
retained in the 15-item GCB, ensuring that each important facet of
conspiracism is successfully reflected in the measure. Overall GCB
scores correlated strongly with scores on a measure of belief in
various event-based conspiracy theories (the BCTI; Swami et al.,
2010), as well as measures assessing belief in three specific conspir-
acy theories (9/11 theories, 7/7 theories, and fictitious Red Bull
theories: Swami et al., 2010, 2011). The factor intercorrelations
mean that in practical use the GCB can be considered a unidi-
mensional measure; however, Study 2 also presented evidence that
the individual factors may differentially predict endorsement of
certain event-based conspiracy theories, to the extent that cer-
tain theories reflect certain facets of conspiracism to a greater
or lesser degree. In sum, these findings indicate criterion-related
validity; that is, that the five generic beliefs assessed by the GCB
successfully predict endorsement of various real-world conspiracy
theories.
Study 3 provided further evidence of criterion-related validity,
finding GCB scores to predict general belief in various event-based
conspiracy theories using an independent sample of the general
public. In addition, and largely consistent with previous find-
ings, GCB scores correlated with other related measures including
low interpersonal trust, anomie, delusional ideation, paranormal
belief, as well as conscientiousness (Goertzel, 1994; Darwin et al.,
2011; Swami et al., 2011). Study 4 demonstrated that GCB scores
were independent of unrelated psychological constructs including
sensation seeking, emotional intelligence, extraversion, and neu-
roticism. Together, Study 3 and 4 indicate that the GCB possesses
convergent and divergent validity.
It should be noted that the self-selection recruitment methods
used in the current research may have resulted in unrepresenta-
tive samples; however we do not believe this to be the case. In
Study 1, 3, and 4, efforts were made to recruit general-population
samples diverse in terms of age, nationality, and beliefs. Study 2
allowed these samples to be compared with a sample of university
students, as is typical of most psychological research. The GCB
demonstrated acceptable psychometric properties when used with
university students as well as when used with a self-selected sam-
ple drawn from the general population. Consistent with previous
research, on the whole our samples indicated modest skepti-
cism toward the existence of conspiracies (e.g., Goertzel, 1994;
Abalakina-Paap et al., 1999; Swami et al., 2010, 2011). In addi-
tion, the relationships between the GCB and other psychological
constructs were largely consistent with previous findings (e.g.,
Goertzel, 1994; Swami et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Darwin et al., 2011).
Our findings show the GCB to be psychometrically at least as
useful as any existing measure of conspiracist ideation which refers
to specific event-based conspiracy theories (e.g., Goertzel, 1994;
Swami et al., 2010; Douglas and Sutton, 2011). Given the strength
of the relationships between the GCB and the BCTI (Swami et al.,
2010), which refers to specific real-world conspiracy theories, it
may be the case that either measure is equally useful when look-
ing at a range of relatively homogeneous, particularly British and
American, samples. However, the GCB has important advantages
over these measures. By sampling from the entire range of universal
and unchanging assumptions from which all specific conspiracy
theories arise we have ensured content validity. In addition, by
removing the context of particular historical events, the GCB offers
a measurement device potentially suitable for more diverse sam-
ple populations and which will endure over time despite changing
trends in popular conspiracy theorizing. We believe these practi-
cal benefits make the GCB a preferable measurement device for
researchers wishing to assess conspiracist ideation.
Given the extent to which the results of exploratory factors
analysis depend on the items which are created as input, it may
have been possible to identify different facets of conspiracism by
beginning with a different list of generic items. In Study 1, we
aimed to reflect a wide range of the most popular conspiracy
theories commonly discussed in the popular and academic lit-
erature. We believe the five facets we identified faithfully reflect
the spectrum of popular conspiracy theorizing in Western cul-
tures. However, different groups or cultures may be preoccupied
with different types of conspiracy theories. In light of this, other
measures of generic conspiracist ideation may be preferable in
some contexts. Efforts to produce even more generic conspiracist
measures than the GCB are underway (Bruder et al., 2013). The
GCB specifies the content and objectives of some conspiracies
(e.g., the suppression of new technology) while remaining non-
specific about any entities or events involved in the conspiracies.
In contrast, Bruder et al.’s Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire
(CMQ) remains largely non-specific in regards to both objectives
and entities or events, with the exception of referring to specifi-
cally political conspiracies. Both approaches may have advantages
and limitations in certain contexts. The relatively more generic
approach of the CMQ may have particular advantages when study-
ing non-Western and non-democratic cultures. Future research
may seek to compare measures of conspiracist ideation across
different cultures directly.
In addition to providing a validated measure of conspir-
acist ideation, the present findings also enhance our theoreti-
cal understanding of belief in conspiracy theories. Wood et al.
(2012) demonstrated that relatively generic beliefs are important
antecedents of specific conspiracy beliefs. The current findings
extend upon this, identifying five underlying conspiracist beliefs
and showing that these generic assumptions about the world
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strongly predict endorsement of various specific conspiracy the-
ories. This is consistent with the idea that conspiracist ideation is
a monological belief system (Goertzel, 1994; Wood et al., 2012)
in which beliefs in many individual conspiracy theories are sup-
ported by relatively generic convictions such as the belief that
governments routinely harm and deceive their citizens. Given
the intercorrelations between the five conspiracist facets observed
here, it is feasible that these convictions are themselves a product of
even more abstract ideas, such as an essential distrust of authority.
While it may be possible to construct a measure which aims to tap
into these abstract sentiments, it is our opinion that the most suc-
cessful measure of conspiracist ideation will be one which achieves
an appropriate balance between specificity and abstractness, as we
feel we have achieved with the GCB.
In sum, we believe our findings show that the GCB is a success-
ful and psychometrically valid measure of individual differences in
conspiracist ideation. The GCB has a number of advantages over
existing measures of conspiracist ideation, making it a preferable
measurement device for use in future research. The psychology
of conspiracist beliefs is thus far a relatively under-researched
topic, but recently it appears that more psychologists are turn-
ing their attention to conspiracy theories (Leman and Cinnirella,
2007; Douglas and Sutton, 2008, 2011; Bogart et al., 2010; Swami
et al., 2010, 2011, 2013; Newheiser et al., 2011; Swami, 2012; Wood
et al., 2012; Jolley and Douglas, 2013). It is our hope that the GCB
will provide researchers wishing to assess individual differences
in conspiracist ideation with a measurement device which can be
used across a wide variety of empirical contexts, resulting in a
consolidated and cohesive body of research.
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APPENDIX
Table A1 | GCB scale instructions and item wording.
Beliefs About the World
There is often debate about whether or not the public is told the whole truth about various important issues. This brief survey is designed to
assess your beliefs about some of these subjects. Please indicate the degree to which you believe each statement is likely to be true on the
following scale: Definitely not true; Probably not true; Not sure/cannot decide; Probably true; Definitely true
1. The government is involved in the murder of innocent citizens and/or well-known public figures, and keeps this a secret
2. The power held by heads of state is second to that of small unknown groups who really control world politics
3. Secret organizations communicate with extraterrestrials, but keep this fact from the public
4. The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some organization
5. Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public
6. The government permits or perpetrates acts of terrorism on its own soil, disguising its involvement
7. A small, secret group of people is responsible for making all major world decisions, such as going to war
8. Evidence of alien contact is being concealed from the public
9. Technology with mind-control capacities is used on people without their knowledge
10. New and advanced technology which would harm current industry is being suppressed
11. The government uses people as patsies to hide its involvement in criminal activity
12. Certain significant events have been the result of the activity of a small group who secretly manipulate world events
13. Some UFO sightings and rumors are planned or staged in order to distract the public from real alien contact
14. Experiments involving new drugs or technologies are routinely carried out on the public without their knowledge or consent
15. A lot of important information is deliberately concealed from the public out of self-interest
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